

Message Text

SECRET

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FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9788

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 KINGSTON 29

NODIS

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FOR SECRETARY'S OFFICE ONLY FOR PAUL BARBIAN

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JM, US

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH JAMAICAN PRIME MINISTER
AND OTHER OFFICIALS: DRAFT MEMCON

1. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT MEMCON FOR SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH
PRIME MINISTER MANLEY ON JANUARY 3, 1976

2. PARTICIPANTS: THE SECRETARY; AMBASSADOR SUMNER GERARD;
DCM JOHN C. DORRANCE (NOTETAKER); PRIME MINISTER MICHAEL
MANLEY; DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF FINANCE DAVID
COORE; MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DUDLEY THOMPSON;
JAMAICAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES ALFRED RATTRAY;
AND PERMANENT SECRETARY, PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, GORDON WELLS.

3. DATE, PLACE AND FUNCTION: LUNCHEON AT JAMAICA HOUSE
HOSTED BY PRIME MINISTER MANLEY, 1400-1600 HOURS, JANUARY
3, 1976.

4. OPENING SOCIAL PLEASANTRIES CONCERNING SECRETARY'S
JAMAICA VACATION.

5. SECRETARY: I FIRST MET DUDLEY THOMPSON IN MEXICO CITY
WHERE HE ASSAULTED ME. BETWEEN THE GUYANESE AND THOMPSON

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WE ARE READY TO GET RID OF THE CARIBBEAN. I DID NOT HEAR

DUDLEY SPEAK DURING THE PARIS MEETING.

6. PRIME MINISTER: DID HE CAUSE ANY PROBLEMS FOR YOU?

7. SECRETARY: NO PROBLEMS.

8. PRIME MINISTER: WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?

9. SECRETARY: THERE WILL BE ANOTHER MINISTERIAL MEETING IN ABOUT A YEAR. NO REAL PROBLEMS AT THE PARIS MEETING ALTHOUGH CALLAHAN MANAGED TO SPEAK FOR ABOUT 25 MINUTES RATHER THAN THE THREE MINUTES HE WAS PERMITTED AS AN AUDITOR.

10. DEPUTY PM COORE: WAS THE MEETING USEFUL?

11. SECRETARY: IT WAS A GOOD MEETING BUT THE RESULTS WILL DEPEND ON HOW WE FOLLOW UP.

12. PRIME MINISTER: WILL IT REALLY GET DOWN TO SPECIFICS?

13. SECRETARY: WE WILL HAVE TO. THE MEETINGS SO FAR HAVE BEEN MAINLY PROCEDURAL.

14. MINEXAFF THOMPSON: THERE IS A VERY DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARIS MEETING, THIS WEEK'S IMF MEETING AND LAW OF THE SEA.

15. SECRETARY: I AM NOT SURE WHAT THE RELATIONSHIP IS TO THE LAW OF THE SEA BUT IF WE CANNOT GET AGREEMENT ON THE 200- MILE LIMIT, OUR CONGRESS WILL LEGISLATE IT.

16. THOMPSON: IF WE DON'T GET AN AGREEMENT SOON, WE WILL BE IN TROUBLE. THE REAL PROBLEM IS SEABED RESOURCES. THERE WAS REAL PROGRESS AT THE SILVER SPRINGS INTER-SESSIONAL MEETING

17 SECRETARY: SHOULD WE HAVE TWO LAW OF THE SEA SESSIONS THIS YEAR?

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18. THOMPSON: NO. WHAT WE NEED IS ONE GOOD WORKING SESSION. EVERYTHING WILL FIT INTO PLACE ONCE THE SITE ISSUE IS SETTLED, ALONG WITH THE QUESTION OF THE POWER OF THE SEABED AUTHORITY. THE REAL PROBLEM HERE IS THE COMPOSITION OF THE AUTHORITY; IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO ASSURE THAT NO ONE GROUP OR SPECIAL-INTEREST BLOCK CAN STALEMATE THE AUTHORITY

19. SECRETARY: WE ARE MOVING TO THE POSITION OF AGREEING THAT THE AUTHORITY CAN MINE THE SEABED, SO LONG AS PRIVATE MINING ALSO WILL BE PERMITTED.

20. THOMPSON: I BELIEVE A PRODUCTION-SHARING SCHEME MIGHT SOLVE MANY PROBLEMS, SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF THE NORWEGIAN PUBLIC/PRIVATE-SHARING SCHEME FOR SEABED RESOURCES.

21. AMBASSADOR GERARD: WHAT ABOUT THE CARIBBEAN?

22. THOMPSON: WE ARE THINKING OF AN INTERNAL SEA, A MODIFICATION OF THE PATRIMONIAL-SEA CONCEPT. TRINIDAD AND MEXICO ACCEPT OUR POSITION. VENEZUELA HAS NOT YET EXPRESSED ITS VIEW.

23. SECRETARY: HOW WOULD YOU ALLOCATE CARIBBEAN RESOURCES?

24. THOMPSON: THIS HAS NOT YET BEEN WORKED OUT BUT ESSENTIALLY WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE A CARIBBEAN REGIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY COVERING THE ENTIRE CARIBBEAN.

25. DEPPM COORE: VENEZUELA PROBABLY WILL OBJECT.

26. SECRETARY: NO 200- MILE TERRITORIAL SEA?

27. THOMPSON: THAT'S RIGHT. A COMMON INTERNAL SEA SHARED BY ALL.

28. DEPPM COORE: PERHAPS SUCH A CONCEPT COULD ALSO APPLY TO THE MEDITERRANEAN AND OTHER SEAS. HOW WOULD YOU GET THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS TOGETHER ON THAT ONE?
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29. THOMPSON: THE CONCEPT COULD APPLY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. I LEAVE THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS TO DR. KISSINGER.

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30. SECRETARY: DO YOU STILL HAVE A GOVERNOR GENERAL?

31. PRIME MINISTER: YES, BUT WE ARE ON THE EDGE OF A NATIONAL DEBATE ABOUT BECOMING A REPUBLIC. THE YOUNG PEOPLE DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR A GOVERNOR GENERAL OR LOYALTY OATHS TO THE QUEEN. WE WILL REMAIN IN THE COMMONWEALTH

32. SECRETARY: WILL THE CHANGE BE SYBOLIC OR SUB-STANTIVE

33. PRIME MINSTER: IT WILL BE ONLY A SYMBOLIC CHANGE, BUT A VERY IMPORTANT ONE

34. PRIME MINISTER: WHEN WILL YOU HAVE TO TURN BACK TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI QUESTION?

35. SECRETARY: ON JANUARY 12 IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER IS COMING TO SEE ME FOR TALKS BEFORE THEN.

36. PRIME MINISTER: IS YOUR NEXT GOAL A SYRIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT OF SOME SORT?

37. SECRETARY: YES

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38. PRIME MINISTER: I SUPPOSE THE TERRITORIAL ISSUES ARE FAR MORE DIFFICULT THAN THEY WERE IN THE SINAI

39. SECRETARY: YES. THERE IS LESS TERRITORY AND THERE IS ALSO THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS WHICH WOULD

HAVE TO BE REMOVED IF ANY SIGNAFICANT AMOUNT OF TERRITORY IS GIVEN UP. THIS MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR ISRAEL TO FALL BACK. I PERSONALLY LIKE SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD VERY MUCH. HE IS EMOTIONAL AND A FIGURE RIGHT OUT OF LAWRENCE OF ARABIA. HE IS IN THE MIDDLE OF A VERY COMPLICATED SITUATION. I ONCE TOLD ASSAD THAT I HAVE KNOWN NEGOTIATORS WHO HAVE GONE NEAR THE EDGE OF THE PRECIPICE, OR TO THE EDGE OF THE PRECIPICE, OR WHO HAVE PUT ONE FOOT OVER THE PRECIPICE. BUT HE IS THE ONLY NEGOTIATOR WHO JUMPED OFF THE PRECIPICE HOPING THERE WOULD BE A TREE WHICH HE COULD CATCH. I ONCE SPENT THREE WEEKS NEGOTIATING WITH HIM WITHOUT SUCCESS. AFTER WORKING OUT A JOING STATEMENT ON THE FAILURE OF THE TALKS, HE STOPPED ME AS I WAS GOING TO THE DOOR TO ASK WHAT COULD BE DONE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. I TOLD HIM STOP HAGGLING AND START NEGOTIATING. WE FINALLY REACHED AN AGREEMENT EARLY THE FOLLOWING MORNING.

40. PRIME MINISTER: THE PROBLEMS I SUPPOSE RELATE VERY MUCH TO EMOTIONS

41. SECRETARY: YES. NEITHER SIDE UNDERSTANDS THE OTHER AND NO ONE IS WILLING TO COMPROMISE.

42. PERMSEC GORDON WELLS: JERUSALEM MUST BE THE MOST INTRACTABLE PROBLEM.

43. SECRETARY: IT IS ONE OF THEM, PLUS THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF THE AREA, ESPECIALLY IN ISRAEL.

44. PRIME MINISTER: IS THERE ANY REAL DANGER OF WAR IN THE NEXT YEAR?

45. SECRETARY: IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE IF THERE IS ONE. WE PROBABLY CAN KEEP THE ISRAELIS FROM STARTING A WAR. THE REAL QUESTION IS THE ARABS.

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46. PRIME MINISTER: DOES MOSCOW HAVE ANY CONTROL OF INFLUENCE OVER THE ARABS?

47. SECRETARY: THE SYRIANS ARE VERY INDEPENDENT. NO ONE SHOULD MAKE THE MISTAKE OF THINKING THE UNITED STATES WILL BE WEAKENED BY ELECTION-YEAR POLITICS, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE PRESENT NATIONALISTIC MODD OF THE UNITED STTTES. THE SYRIANS SHOULD WAIT FOR AT LEAST A YEAR. THEY HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE.

48. PRIME MINISTER: WHAT WOULD BE THE MILITARY SITUATION IF THEREIS ANOTHER WAR?

49. SECRETARY; ISRAEL WITHOUT QUESTION WOULD WIN MILITARILY--TACTICALLY--BUT SUFFER HEAVY CASUALTIES. POLITICALLY, THE SITUATION WOULD BE BACK TO 1973.

50. SECRETARY: HOW WAS YOUR NEW YORK TRIP?

51. PRIME MINISTER: IS WAS SHORTBUT USEFUL. WE HAD A VERY GOOD MEETING WITH THE ALCOA PEOPLE AND SET THE STAGE FOR SETTLING THE BAUXITE SQUABBLE

52. AMBASSADOR GERARD: I FEEL OPTIMISTIC. ALCOA APPEARS TO BE TAKING A LONG-RANGE VIEW ABOUT ITS INTERESTS IN JAMAICA

53. SECRETARY: HOW SOON WOULD YOU HOPE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT?

54. PRIME MINISTER: WE HOPE TO SETTLE WITH ALCOA THIS MONTH

55. SECRETARY: I AM SORRY I WAS OUT OF TWON WHEN YOU WERE IN THE STATES. WHENEVER YOU ARE IN THE UNITED STATES I WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO SEE YOU. (DISCUSSION AT THIS POINT TURNED TO U.S. PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS.)

56. SECREATY: (TO DEPM COORE) DO YOU SHARE THE VIEWS OF OUR ECONOMISTS ON PRESENT TRENDS?

57 COORE: YES. BUT THE SITUATION IS VERY VOLATILE AND SECRET

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COULD CHANGE SUDDENLY. FOR INSTANCE, IF THERE WERE A NEW MIDDLE EAST WAR.

58. PRIME MINISTER: WE ATTACH CONSIDERABLE SIGNIFICANCE TO IMPROVING TOURISM FIGURES THIS YEAR.

59. COORE: THE TOURISM INDUSTRY IS PICKING UP RAPIDLY, ESPECIALLY FROM THE U.S. (THE DISCUSSION AT THIS POINT TURNED TO NON-SUBSTANTIVE REMARKS ON THE SECRETARY'S WORK DAY WHILE ON VACATION.)

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60. PRIME MINISTER: WHAT SORT OF REPORTS ARE YOU GETTING ON ANGOLA?

61. SECRETARY: IF ALL FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS COULD GET OUT, ANGOLA COULD SORT ITSELF OUT RATHER QUICKLY. WE DO NOT FAVOR ANY PARTICULAR FACTION. WE ARE NOT OPPOSED TO THE MPLA PER SE, ONLY TO CUBAN AND RUSSIAN SUPPORT AND INTERVENTION. I WOULD APPRECIATE THAT POINT BEING PASSED TO THE MPLA.

62. PRIME MINISTER: THAT IS IMPORTANT. I DID NOT KNOW THAT. THE MPLA DELEGATION VN KINGSTON TOLD US THAT THEY HAD NOTHING AGAINST THE U.S. OR CHINA AND WISHED THERE WERE SOME WAY THEY COULD TALK TO THEM. THEY FEEL EMBATTLED AND ARE ACCEPTING ASSISTANCE FROM MOSCOW AND CUBA ONLY BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE. THEY EMPHASIZED TO US THEIR NATIONALISM AND OBJECTED TO BEING TYPECASE AS COMMUNISTS.

63 SECRETARY: WE WISH TO SEE ALL FOREIGNERS OUT AND AN OAU-SUPERVISED SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT. WE WOULD SUPPORT ANY GOVERNMENT OF UNITY

64. PRIME MINISTER: SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERVENTION PRESENTS A SPECIAL PROBLEM

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65. SECRETARY: THEY MUST GO WITH THE REST.

66. PRIME MINISTER: THEIR PRESENCE IS A PARTICULARLY

EMOTIVE ONE. I PERSONALLY HAVE DIFFICULTY THINKING RATIONALLY ABOUT ANGOLA BECAUSE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESENCE

67. SECRETARY: I THINK WE CAN INDUCE SOUTH AFRICA TO ANNOUNCE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES FROM ANGOLA BEFORE THE NEXT OAU MEETING

68. PRIME MINISTER: MOST KEY OAU GOVERNMENTS WERE AGAINST ALL FOREIGN INTERVENTION UNTIL SOUTH AFRICA ENTERED THE ACT.

69. SECRETARY: OUR CONCERN IS A NEW SOVIET PRESENCE IN AN AREA 8,000 MILES FROM MOSCOW WHERE THERE IS NO TRADITIONAL RUSSIAN INTEREST. WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRECEDENT ESTABLISHED BY CUBA'S INTERVENTION. IF WE CAN LIVE WITH FRELIMO IN MOZAMBIQUE, WE CAN CERTAINLY LIVE WITH THE MPLA

70. PRIME MINISTER: THE MPLA DELEGATION FIRMLY DENIED THAT IT IS COMMUNIST. THEY DID NOT LIKE BEING DESCRIBED AS SOVIET AND CUBAN PUPPETS.

71. SECRETARY: KENNETH KAUNDA DURING A WASHINGTON VISIT IN 1974 PRESSED FOR U.S. SUPPORT OF ANTI-MPLA FACTIONS. WE REFUSED. BUT THE SOVIET BUILDUP BEGAN IN EARLY 1975. OUR SMALL ASSISTANCE BEGAN AFTER THE SOVIET BUILDUP AND CUBAN INTERVENTION. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE AN END TO ALL GREAT POWER INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA. THIS WOULD BE THE BEST THING FOR ANGOLA.

27. PRIME MINISTER: YOU THINK YOU CAN GET THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO ANNOUNCE WITHDRAWAL BEFORE JANUARY 10?

73. SECRETARY: THAT IS WHAT WE ARE WORKING ON.

74. AMBASSADOR GERARD WHAT DID THE MPLA DELEGATION ASK FOR, BESIDES RECOGNITION, WHILE IN JAMAICA ?
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75. PRIME MINISTER: MAINLY TRAINING, ESPECIALLY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, HEALTH, MEDICAL CARE AND AGRICULTURE

76. SECRETARY: ARE YOU IN TOUCH WITH THE AFRICANS ON ANGOLA?

77. PRIME MINISTER: MAINLY KAUNDA. HE IS VERY STRONG ON ENDING ALL FOREIGN INTERFERENCE. I AM ALSO TRYING TO

GET IN TOUCH WITH NYERERE, BUT HE IS PRESENTLY IN A VILLAGE THAT HAS NO TELEPHONES.

78.

SECRETARY: NYERERE AFTER RECOGNIZING THE MPLA NOW APPEARS TO BE SUPPORTING KAUNDA'S POSITION. I BELIEVE MOZAMBIQUE MAY ALSO BE MOVING IN THIS DIRECTION.

79. SECRETARY (TO THOMPSON): ARE YOU GOING TO THE OAS MEETING IN CHILE?

80. THOMPSON: THAT IS A TERRIBLE GOVERNMENT. HAVE YOU READ ABOUT THE BRITISH WITHDRAWING THEIR AMBASSADOR BECAUSE OF THE TORTURE OF A BRITISH DOCTOR?

81. PRIME MINISTER: THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT IS AN ABOMINABLE REGIME.

82. THOMPSON: I DON'T LIKE HAVING THE OAS MEETING IN CHILE, ESPECIALLY AFTER PINOCHET FIRST AGREED AND THEN REFUSED TO LET SOMEONE LOOK THROUGH HIS KEYHOLE. ONLY MEXICO JOINED US IN OPPOSING HAVE THE OAS MEETING IN SANTIAGO

83. SECRETARY: THE VOTE WAS 9 TO 8 IN FAVOR?

84. THOMPSON: YES, WITH GRENADA CASTING THE DECIDING VOTE. ARGENTINA IS ALSO A MESS

85. SECRETARY: I GUESS THEY WILL GET RID OF MRS. PERON SOON. (AT THIS POINT LUNCHEON MEETING ENDED. THE SECRET

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SECRETARY AND PRIME MINISTER MANLEY THEN HELD A PRIVATE DISCUSSION FOR APPROXIMATELY 45 MINUTES. NO NOTETAKER PRESENT.) GERARD

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